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Abstract
International actors have used multiple discursive frameworks for justifying interventions, from human security to the re-
sponsibility to protect, and,most recently, resilience-building.We argue that the language of normalization, hidden behind
these narratives of interventions, has also contributed to structure the intervention landscape, albeit in less obvious and
overt ways than other competing narratives of intervention. This article disentangles the different practices of normaliza-
tion in order to highlight their ramifications. It introduces the concept of normal peace—a new conceptual reference to
understand interventions undertaken by the international community to impose, restore or accept normalcy in turbulent
societies. The article argues that the optimization of interventions entails selective responses to govern risk and adapt to
the transitional international order. The art of what is politically possible underlines the choice of optimal intervention,
be that to impose an external order of normalcy, restore the previous order of normalcy, or accept the existing order
of normalcy.
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1. Introduction
The narratives of normalcy and normalization have been
present for some time in the social practices of peace-
building and in broader International Relations (IR) de-
bates, but there has been a lack of explicit effort to the-
orize their meaning(s) in practice. The notion of ‘nor-
malization’ in the IR discipline has more often than not
been used interchangeably with the notion of ‘peace’,
and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations (Bull,
1977). In peace and conflict studies, normalcy is invoked
interchangeably as a normative goal of peacebuilding,
as an intermediary measurement of success towards
sustainable peace, or as a processual mechanism fa-
cilitating other post-conflict processes (e.g. ‘reconcilia-
tion’ or ‘good governance’). For instance, the United
Nations (UN) has used normalcy in parallel to the no-
tions of peace, stability, and reconstruction (UN Gen-
eral Assembly and Security Council, 2005, p. 19). Cer-
tain UN policy documents explicitly treat normalcy as a
passage to peace consolidation and recovery (UN Peace-
building Support Office, 2012). In other instances, nor-
malcy is invoked as a politics of care towards local sub-
jects and an aspirational mechanism for generating lo-
cal acceptance and validity for the external rulers (UN,
2008). Similarly, the European Union (EU) has started to
invoke ‘normalization-building’ as a rationale for describ-
ing its conflict-resolution and crisis-management opera-
tions abroad. Javier Solana, the EU’s first High Represen-
tative for Foreign and Security Policy, argued that ‘crisis
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managementmissions have been at the heart of the EU’s
stabilisation and normalisation efforts in the Balkans’
(European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2013,
p. 3). How should we make sense of these very diverse
narratives of normalcy? This paper argues that these dif-
ferent praxeological invocations of normalcy and normal-
ization have not been given the level of interest that
they deserve in the field of IR, and peace and conflict
studies more precisely, for two main reasons. First, be-
cause these social practices have been subsumed within
other general interpretative categories (see, for instance,
the vibrant literature on ‘liberal peacebuilding’, but also
the Responsibility to Protect, the human security or re-
silience literatures), which have obscured more than re-
vealed normalization practices. Second, when normalcy
and normalization narratives and practices have been
specifically analysed, specific form of interventions have
generally been treated separately and in disconnection
with the knowledge base in IR and in peace and conflict
studies that gives meaning to these normalcy interven-
tions. In this article, wewill mobilize—inmore an illustra-
tive than a systematic fashion—three specific literatures
in the field of peace and conflict studies, with the aim
of linking these literatures with specific sets of normal-
ization practices: fragile states and liberal peacebuilding
(imposing normalcy), resilience (restoring normalcy) and
indigeneity and authenticity (accepted normalcy).
We argue in this article that normalization can be
understood as a reformulation of existing governmen-
tality practices, while at the same time representing a
new strategic narrative that seeks to legitimate existing
interventionary practices, and when necessary to adjust
to the fluid international order. We assemble the broad
variety of discourses and practices on normalization in
peacebuilding, and make sense of these interventionary
practices by presenting them in a continuum of prac-
tices of domination and of the management of individu-
als and societies: from the imposition to the restoration
and acceptance of normalcy. The fluidity and optimiza-
tion of discourses and practices of normalcy articulated
through an assemblage of interventionary measures (Vi-
soka, 2017b) represent a will to govern which is not nec-
essary attached to liberal normative frameworks, but
constantly changes the referent objects of intervention.
The first mode of normalization, imposing normalcy,
implies external intervention in a particular society con-
sidered as being ‘abnormal’ due to the experience of vi-
olent conflict or being generally considered ‘fragile’ and
in need of intervention. These societies are conceptual-
ized as in dire need of normalization through the impo-
sition of external blueprints of normalcy, in the form of
norms, rules, standards, practices in distinct areas of gov-
ernance, institutions, economy, social relations, and cul-
ture. The second mode of normalization, restoring nor-
malcy, encompasses practices that seek to restore a so-
ciety to its previous condition, a condition deemed nor-
mal and acceptable for international and local actors af-
ter experiencing a particular difficulty that required exter-
nal assistance. The third and final form of normalization,
accepting normalcy, implies the acceptance of a particu-
lar local version of normalcy by external actors, as either
a strategic withdrawal of governance responsibilities or
ontological permutation of difference. We refer to these
three sets of social practices taken together as normal
peace, which lies at the intersection between the govern-
mentality of other and ‘the self’, enabling specific forms
of intervention to regulate or deal altogether with the so-
cieties deemed ‘abnormal’ or ‘dysfunctional’. This discus-
sion echoes Roberto Esposito’s discussion of the immuno-
logical pursuit of self-preservation against the other as a
progressive ‘interiorization of exteriority’. What remains
constant for Esposito is ‘the place where the threat is lo-
cated, always on the border between the inside and the
outside, between the self and the other, the individual
and the common’ (Esposito, 2008, p. 2). It is the recogni-
tion that the other is not simply external to me, which is
to say, other to me (Donà, 2006, p. 57). It ‘takes the out-
side inside’ (Donà, 2006, pp. 57–58) and forms a dialectic
of the excluding inclusion or inclusive exclusion.
Three modes of normalization elaborated in great
length in this article constitute the dominant narrative
of normal peace, which encompasses a broad range
of fluid narratives and strategic frameworks for making
sense of intervention and non-interventions in the tur-
bulent societies. In this context, normal peace can be de-
fined as a set of governmentality practices aimed at dis-
ciplining and regulating societies deemed ‘abnormal’ or
‘dysfunctional’ through wide-ranging forms of interven-
tions. In turn, normalization practices—imposing, restor-
ing, and accepting normalcy—are ‘made possible’ by
specific discourses (Foucault, 1988, p. 19). In our case,
three specific discourses, or more appropriately knowl-
edge, enable normal peace practices: the failed or frag-
ile states discourse and its counterpart, the liberal peace-
building discourse, are associated with imposing peace;
the discourse on resilience is associated with restoring
normalcy; and the discourse on indigeneity is associ-
ated with accepted normalcy. These discourses, associ-
ated with the underlying sets of practices, in turn, inher-
ently shape the governmentality practices behind nor-
mal peace. The governmentality of normal peace lies,
then, at the intersection between the technologies of
domination of others and those of the self, and the inter-
play between the two enables different actors to create
the subjects of interventions as well as to legitimize spe-
cific forms of international peacebuilding interventions.
Accordingly, unveiling various mutations of new
strategic narratives governing international interven-
tions and their unprincipled and political interests has
far-reaching consequences for the normative credibility
of Western democracies and global institutions. This pa-
per is organized as follows. First, we explore the concepts
of normalcy and normalization by linking them with the
work of Foucault. We then explore in more detail the
technologies of normalization in the specific context of
peacebuilding interventions by looking alternatively at
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imposed, restored, and accepted normalcy. The paper
concludes with a problematization of the contemporary
politics of normalization by looking at the ramifications
of the normal peace agenda.
2. On Being and Becoming Normal
Narratives are important epistemological categories for
making sense of social world. In essence, narratives rep-
resent condensed interpretation of meanings, norms,
values, events, social facts, and experiences (see: El-
liott, 2005; Herman & Vervaeck, 2001). They can take
the shape of policy discourses, stories, and textual and
performative articulations. Conceptual narratives of nor-
malcy and normalization have been variously defined in
different disciplines, making the notions essentially con-
tested and contingent on semantic interpretations. For
a start, Sigmund Freud is often associated with the con-
ceptualization of normalcy—through his psychoanalyti-
cal perspective—while Michel Foucault has been at the
forefront of developing a critical account of the historic-
ity of normalization practices; Freud engaged in exploring
the inner constraints of normalization (Ipperciel, 1998),
whereas Foucault focused on the external forces, pow-
ers, and technologies of normalization.While Freud’s per-
spective is to a certain extent relevant for our study, we
are more interested in exploring the external dimensions
of normalization through the prism of different technolo-
gies of knowledge andpractice. Foucault approachednor-
malcy and normalization from the perspective of the bio-
politics of power, governmentality, and disciplinary tech-
nologies. He has been highly influential in developing crit-
ical accounts in peace and security studies, which led to
the development of the field of international political so-
ciology (see indicatively: Bonditti, Bigo, & Gros, 2017).
While Foucault’s work on bio-politics, resistance, and gov-
ernmentality has been extensively applied to the sub-
field of peace and conflict studies, his work on normaliza-
tion has been examinedmore often than not indirectly as
a by-product of other related notions. Foucault held that
the idea of normalization is to impose precise normswith-
out having to resort to punishment, thus representing
the most ‘advanced’ form of interventionism in society.
Essentially, the production of norms is the production of
power, which requires people to change their practices
to ensure conformity with collective social norms (Taylor,
2009, p. 52). For Foucault (2003, p. 50), the norm is an ‘el-
ement on the basis of which a certain exercise of power is
founded and legitimized’. Thus, normalization is the hid-
den governance of social relations in the wake of moder-
nity and the perceived necessity for governing all aspects
of society. The purpose of disciplinary technology is to en-
sure the compliance of societywith certain norms, where
the punishment is hidden in the institutionalmechanisms
of governance. Hence, normalization is:
a system of finely gradated and measurable inter-
vals in which individuals can be distributed around a
norm—a norm which both organizes and is the result
of this controlled distribution. A system of normaliza-
tion is opposed to a system of law or a system of per-
sonal power. (Robinow, 1984, p. 20)
As Foucault (2003, p. 50) holds, ‘the norm’s function is
not to exclude and reject. Rather, it is always linked to
a positive technique of intervention and transformation,
to a sort of normative project’.
For Foucault, the normal is determined through its
opposite—the abnormal—whereby the differentiation
of these two constitutes their distinctions. The practice
of this distinction between normal and abnormal en-
ables the delineation of identity and the production of
power. Abnormality has historically evolved through the
practice of ‘expert medico-legal opinion’, which holds
the power to determine the field of normal from the
abnormal. Through the discussion of abnormality, Fou-
cault (2003, p. 61) tried to explain the ‘technology of
human abnormality’, which for him ‘appears precisely
when a regular network of knowledge and power has
been established that brings the three figures together
or, at any rate, invests themwith the same system of reg-
ularities’. This conception of abnormality then, in turn,
allows or justifies psychiatric and administrative inter-
ventions. This signifies that the technology of normaliza-
tion requires the creation and classification of anoma-
lies and deviations, as well as the isolation or reforma-
tion of these abnormal individuals through coercive, cor-
rective, or therapeutic interventions. Foucault also ar-
gues that the imposition of a particular regime of nor-
malcy and homogeneity goes hand in hand with the pro-
duction and systematization of knowledge, which sup-
ports the normalization of social affairs. This hegemony
of normalcy is themain trigger of resistance, which seeks
to normalize another set of phenomena, which are per-
ceived as being abnormal (Bigo, 2008, p. 99). Hence, for
Foucault, questioning norms and unmasking their effects
on power opens up many possibilities for preserving and
expanding freedom (Taylor, 2009, p. 46). Normalization
can hardly be considered to contribute to the politics of
empowerment simply because its very logic is situated
on the binary between the forces that possess the knowl-
edge and authority to normalize others and the devalued,
discredited ones who are deviant and ‘in need of treat-
ment’. Every practice of normalization results in a pro-
cess of marginalization and exclusion of other practices
deemed abnormal.
3. How Things Become (Ab)Normal: Normalization in
Practice
During the Cold War era, interventions to discipline and
regulate societiesweremostly reframed and understood,
by academics and policy-makers alike, through the lens
of ideological affiliation and a bipolar world order. Af-
ter the age of bipolar rivalry, post-Cold War interven-
tions have been framed, rather, within the strategic nar-
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ratives of humanitarian intervention, human security
and the responsibility to protect, liberal peacebuilding,
and resilience. These multiple narratives serve to cast
light from a specific angle, obscuring other phenomena
in the process. While specific references to normalcy
and normalization have been and are still frequent in
interventionary discourses, they have been subsumed
within wider analytical categories and have hence lost
all their specific and autonomous meanings (see Miskim-
mon, O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2017). It is therefore central
to understanding practices of normalization in the con-
text of intervention and peacebuilding to explore specific
techniques that the international community—defined
here as formal and informal assemblages of state and
non-state actors around the UN, regional organizations
or more ad hoc coalitions—invoke to deal with ‘turbu-
lent societies’ that represent a threat to or disturbance
of what is perceived as a normal state of affairs in the
society of states. Understanding the politics of normal-
ization requires exploring the technologies of selectiv-
ity, namely when to consider something normal and
when to brand it as ‘abnormal’, when to intervene to im-
pose and restore normalcy, and when to conveniently
accept the heterogeneity of normalcy and co-exist with
other ‘abnormalities’.
3.1. Imposed Normalcy: Creating Liberal Subjects
Externally imposed normalcy has been particularly
salient in post-conflict societies affected by civil war
and internal violent conflict, through stabilization, peace-
building, and statebuilding interventions (Lemay-Hébert,
2009; Visoka, 2016a). Imposed normalcy practices are
made possible through a specific reading and mapping
of the world as being composed of ‘strong’, ‘efficient’,
and hence ‘sovereign’ states at one end of the spec-
trum, and weak, failed, and collapsed states in need of
transformation and intervention at the other. Framing
conflict-affected societies as ‘abnormal’, ‘violent’, ‘illib-
eral’, or ‘fragile’ justifies external intervention to impose
normalcy. These signifiers, each in their own way, act
as prescriptive terms, ‘employed in connection with the
contemplation and execution of international involve-
ment’ (Jackson, 2004, p. 22). Hence, imposed normalcy
takes all its meanings through an approach of abnormal-
ization of specific societies seen as unable to manage
their own affairs or ‘perform functions necessary tomeet
citizens’ basic needs and expectations’ (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2008;
on a critical take on OECD’s interpretation of fragile
states, see Lemay-Hébert &Mathieu, 2014). The process
of abnormalization may involve an assemblage of differ-
ent techniques, such as discursive statements, framing
of events, and audio-visual evidence, which help consti-
tute over time a particular image of abnormality. This
process of abnormalization of local societies might dis-
regard local knowledge and practices which can be con-
sidered normal in Western societies. However, without
such discursive abnormalization intervention might be
deemed as unnecessary, which is not what external ac-
tors often desire.
In this context, state ‘performance’ becomes the
yardstick of normalcy, whereby liberal democracies
are instituted as models of governance (Lemay-Hébert,
2013). Normalcy is defined as a fairly specific set of func-
tions every state is supposed to perform (seen through
a technocratic or institutionalist lens, i.e. what require-
ments the state should meet) and as a set of ideals to
which actors and institutions have to conform (through
a normative lens, i.e. how the state should meet its re-
quirements). This enables the ranking of states accord-
ing to their performance, which leads to the identifi-
cation of the ‘core of monstrosity behind little abnor-
malities’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 56). The discourse on frag-
ile and failed states is directly linked with practices of
normalization, thereby legitimizing the imposition of a
particular normalcy in countries considered pathologi-
cally ill or unable (or unwilling) to govern themselves. If
we follow existing statistics and rankings of state perfor-
mance, there are currently 34 fragile states, and over 60
per cent of the world’s population live in undemocratic
societies. This naturally opens up perspectives of inter-
vention in these ‘dysfunctional’ societies. As Caroline
Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac (2005, p. 873) argue, this
global discourse ‘fixes culpability for war on the societies
in question, rendering the domestic populations dysfunc-
tional while casting international rescue interventions
as functional’. In this context, one could argue that the
international order fundamentally rests on ‘techniques
of transformation of abnormal elements into responsi-
ble and well-functioning members of a community’ (Zan-
otti, 2006, p. 152). Hence, this is the dual nature of the
discourse—defining certain ‘Western’ societies as nor-
mal while considering those that do not conform to the
standard as ‘abnormal’—that effectively opens up the
possibility of imposing normalization practices.
Knowledge production about conflict societies is at
the heart of the technology of international normaliza-
tion. Since the end of the Cold War, the discourse of nor-
malization has been invoked by scholars as a problem-
solving approach to violent conflicts. In her early writing,
Mary Kaldor (1996, p. 510) proposed creating zones of
‘normality’ to protect civilians from violent conflict, thus
creating conditions for normalization through robust
peacekeeping and international administration. Bridging
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Kaldor (1996) held that
‘after cease-fire agreements, the tasks of peace-keeping
have to be extended beyond the separation of forces to
civil security in order to establish peace-time conditions
and assist ‘normalization’, including freedom of move-
ment, the return of refugees, and the capture of war
criminals’. She equates peacebuildingwith normalization
as a stage that precedes a settlement. Others equate nor-
malcy with reconstruction. Lorraine Elliott (2003, p. 272)
argues that ‘social reconstruction or normalisation, and
the rebuilding of a just and equitable civil society, are es-
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sential components of long-term peacebuilding’. Elliott
considers as ‘social normalization’ working with vulnera-
ble groups in the society through therapeutic interven-
tions, material support, and service provision. Moving
from normalcy as a processual stage to the desired end
goal, Richard Caplan (2005, p. 198) defines ‘normality’ as
‘a stable peace and the establishment of effective mech-
anisms of domestic democratic governance’. Other en-
tities consider normalization as the final stage of post-
conflict recovery, when extraordinary measures are re-
moved, self-sustainability of peace is established, and
‘the internal and external relations are conducted accord-
ing to generally accepted norms of behaviour’ (Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2002, p. 2).
Imposing normalcy on ‘abnormal’ states then be-
comes a normal—even irrefutable—practice, which ‘nat-
urally’ flows from the diagnostic posed by scholars and
the various indices of state failure created to support
these practices (Grimm, Lemay-Hébert, & Nay, 2014).
The list of countries where normalcy was imposed by
outside forces—either through peacebuilding missions
or other forms of intervention—is long and covers all re-
gions of the world. Many examples of UN peacebuilding
missions comprise normative agendas that consist of ex-
ternal blueprints for democratization, good governance,
the rule of law, neoliberal economics, and liberal civil so-
ciety, which are considered as prerequisites to enforcing
‘normal social relations’ after violent conflict (Väyrynen,
2010, p. 140). Most evidently, many peacebuilding in-
terventions aim to build ‘normal societies’ that vaguely
mimic Western democratic societies. Such regimes of
norms, practices, and values are imposed on ‘abnormal
post-conflict societies’ to ensure their normalizationwith
a new political and societal order to maintain stability,
peace, and development and prevent the recurrence and
spillover of violence.
External normalization practices entail a degree of
alienation, whereby changing existing cultural and col-
lective referent systems is considered a new normalcy.
Local social norms and order are deemed incompati-
ble with the possibility of peace, which in turn necessi-
tates external engineering of local norms of how to reg-
ulate social and political relations (Lemay-Hébert & Kap-
pler, 2016). Interventions seek to impose new social con-
ventions through ‘capacity-building’ programmes, knowl-
edge transfer, and learning by undertaking mentorships.
The technology of normalization is legitimized through
the use of ‘blueprints’ and ‘best practice’ regimes, which
seek to increase local acceptance of the intervention and
remove any competing local know-how registers. Local
culture and social order in conflict-affected societies are
classified as failed, illiberal, and traditional, and thus can-
not be included in the ‘solution’ (Visoka, 2017a). The very
fact that those societies have failed to maintain peace
and have become a source of regional instability means
they are seen as having lost their civility. The ontology
of imposed normalcy is rooted in the logic that institu-
tions and norms such as democracy, human rights, the
rule of law, and the market economy are universal by na-
ture and thus can be adjusted to be applicable to post-
conflict societies through technical intervention.
At the heart of the normalization of post-conflict
societies has been a process of normative production,
which entails imposing new norms to govern peace, sta-
bility, and development in these war-shattered societies.
Strong emphasis on institution-building aims to gener-
ate predictable social and political behaviour and es-
tablish a social contract with strong political obligations
for citizens (Visoka & Richmond, 2017). New regulatory
regimes are imposed to govern political life in such a
way as to ensure ethnic accommodation and reduce lo-
cal resistance to and accept the authority of interna-
tional interveners. For example, the international com-
munity implanted new, modern legislation in Kosovo
that aimed both to bind the country to the highest demo-
cratic standards and to facilitate its eventual integra-
tion into the EU (Guéhenno, 2015). Normalization re-
quires strong enforcement capabilities. In certain places,
such as Timor-Leste, the international community has de-
ployed armed peacekeepers and international police to
enforce post-conflict stabilization and facilitate the im-
plementation of peacebuilding and statebuilding agen-
das (Harris & Goldsmith, 2011). Hence, normalization
can be imposed throughmilitary rule as well as soft inter-
ventions through international neo-trusteeships, ad hoc
technical assistance, and shuttle diplomacy.
3.2. Restored Normalcy: Building Resilient Subjects
In another set of discourses and practices, normalcy and
normalization have been alternatively justified as inter-
ventions that aim to facilitate the return to ‘conditions
before the intervention’ (Kratochwil, 2010, p. 198), a sit-
uation deemed normal and acceptable for international
and local actors. Interventions for restoring normalcy are
seen as successful even if they only entail a return to
dismal pre-conflict levels, which are primarily concerned
with the creation of the effect of ‘semblance of normalcy’
(Tamer-Chammas, 2012, p. 218). In this cluster of social
practices, normalcy is understood both as a willingness
for conflict-affected societies to return to antebellum
social, political and economic conditions, while at the
same time being linked to local and international percep-
tions of what constitutes ‘stability’ in this context. Hence,
most restored normalcy practices do not lead to a return
to a mythical ‘previous condition’, or ‘pre-event norms,’
but instead create new features of normalcy—a mirror
image of the status quo ante that does not, however,
exactly match the original image of normalcy. In these
contradictory invocations, the narrative of resilience rep-
resents an attempt to convert extraordinary and emer-
gency conditions into normal conditions of co-existence
with violent abnormalities.
The discourse of restoring normalcy as a return to the
status quo ante can be found in numerous interventions,
which include a wide variety of actors. In this context, lo-
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cal businesses can be seen as having a large role in restor-
ing ‘some form of normalcy’ in a post-conflict setting
while being instrumental in promoting ‘pockets of nor-
malcy’ during conflict (Sweetman, 2009, p. 57). The same
could be said of traditional, non-state leaders who have
been identified as crucial actors in ‘restoring some sem-
blance of normalcy and security’ in Darfur (Tubiana, Tan-
ner, & Abdul-Jalil, 2012, p. 102), in Somalia (Jeng, 2012, p.
272) or in Sierra Leone (Martin, 2016). The discourse of
restoring normalcy has also found traction in the disaster
relief literature, where it has come to be associated with
recovery efforts, defined as the protracted process of re-
cuperating pre-event norms. This is a discourse that has
been used in numerous post-disaster situations, such as
the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan (Tisdall, 2013).
In this context, restoring normalcy can be traced to
the burgeoning discourses and practices of resilience-
building in conflict- and disaster-affected societies. The
resilience-building discourse is replete with ‘building
back better’ semantics. For instance, the United Nations
Development Programme (2010, p. 19) presents its re-
covery efforts as focusing largely on ‘restoring normalcy
following a crisis, transitioning effectively from crisis to
development, and using recoverywork as an opportunity
to build back better’. Similarly, resilience is about adapt-
ability and recovery, and as such resilience seeks to nor-
malize instability through a succession of various forms
of intervention (Anderson, 2015, p. 62). For instance, the
OECD (2011, p. 15) defines social resilience as ‘the capac-
ity of a community (or organisation) to adapt under ad-
verse conditions and restore a sense of normalcy from
an external shock’. In this context, resilience entails com-
ing to terms with a permanent state of affairs made of
contingency, adaptability, vulnerability, and instability.
In their critical account of resilience, Brad Evans and Ju-
lian Reid (2014, p. 3) argue that ‘instability and insecu-
rity are the new normal as we become increasingly at-
tuned to living in complex and dynamic systems which
offer no prospect of control’. The resilience-building dis-
course is closely linked to the failure to impose normalcy,
as discussed earlier. Hence, resilience signifies the recog-
nition of external limits to (re)build political structures
and to drastically transform ‘abnormal’ post-conflict so-
cieties. Such realization permits changing the focus of
interventions from transformation to self-management
and confinement of risks.
Although emergencies are defined as ‘urgent situ-
ations created by an abnormal event’ (OECD, 2006),
they are no longer exceptional and extraordinary events.
The amplification and repetition of vulnerabilities has
brought them to the point of normalization. Emergen-
cies have increasingly become normal events, which re-
main for ‘the subject to learn to take care of their own
endangered destinies’ (Evans & Reid, 2014, p. 89). The
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(2015, p. 3) argues that ‘protracted is the new normal’,
referring to the longevity of humanitarian crises andhigh-
lighting the international reluctance to end protracted
crises. After the realization that stability is a myth, re-
silience ‘becomes a normalized standard formapping out
(ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of suc-
cess are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity’
(Evans & Reid, 2014, p. 103). Craig Calhoun (2008, p. 67)
suggests that ‘today we see not one large emergency dis-
missed as an exception, but innumerable smaller ones
still treated as exceptions to an imaginary norm but re-
peated so frequently as to be normalized’. The normal-
ization of emergencies makes resilience a coping mecha-
nism to deal with anticipated and permanent crises. This
instability is not viewed as necessarily abnormal in this
framework, and conflicts and disasters are seen not ‘as
deviations of the normal state of affairs’ but as inherently
constitutive of the reality many Third World countries
face on the everyday level. Interventions are not con-
fined to exceptional situations but acknowledge the con-
tinuities and discontinuities between crisis and normalcy
(Duijsens & Faling, 2014, p. 172). This approach moves
towards a ‘vulnerability framework’ where normal daily
life becomes difficult to distinguish from disaster (Wis-
ner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2003, p. 10). However, this
shift not only ignores the root causes of turbulent events,
but also disregards the multiplicity of consequences that
are now deemed as normal and expected.
Paradoxically, the technology of restoring normalcy
entails both the optimization and withdrawal of respon-
sibility for previous failures to impose and maintain nor-
malcy, as well as new tactical interventionism which
seeks to impose normalcy through building resiliency
and self-sufficiency (Chandler, 2014). Thus, the very act
of striving to build autonomous societies locks local so-
cieties into new forms of dependence on external re-
sources and expertise, and unequal power relations. In
other words, international efforts to restore normalcy
represent a renewed rationale to govern risks and vul-
nerabilities at their source and suspend any modernist
fallacy about progress or stability. The narrative of re-
siliency is gradually becoming a withdrawal symptom
from the liberal aspirational politics of global progress
and positive transformation of human condition while
preserving same old fluid interventionary practices with-
out the burden of local acceptance and global legitimacy.
3.3. Accepted Normalcy: Coping with Difference
A third set of narratives and practices revolves around
accepting normalcy, where international actors seek to
manage risks through recognition of the plurality of ways
of life. Like the two other categories of normalization
practices, recognising alterity and coping with difference
is unfolding both as a knowledge production process and
as a set of practices. In the context of normal peace, ac-
cepting the world as it is takes on two major meanings.
First, accepting normalcy can take the shape of an exit
strategy for interveners after failed attempts to impose
or restore normalcy and, at the same time, works as a dis-
cursive tactic to avoid the responsibility of any undesired
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results (see Visoka & Doyle, 2014). Second, accepting
normalcy is also used as a discourse to justify and legit-
imize non-intervention towards societies which could be
labelled as ‘abnormals’ from a universalist perspective—
for instance, societies experiencing internal troubles and
not following normative regimes of human rights. The
discourse on heterogeneity and indigeneity informed by
cultural relativism is often advocated by critical scholars
as a pathway for finding alternative paradigms to build-
ing sustainable peace after violent conflicts. For various
reasons, international actors come to accept this ‘ab-
normality’ as a new form of normalcy, and implicitly or
explicitly recognize the limits of external imposition or
restoration of normalcy in the process of reshaping these
societies. Combined, these two types of knowledge en-
able new forms of practices of accepted normalcy.
Accepting normalcy of conflict-affected societies,
fragile states, and disaster-affected places has become
synonymous with ‘the art of what is politically possible’
(Donais, 2012, p. 152). It represents coming to terms
with the practical limits of international interventions,
which does not represent the end of interventions but
rather signifies the birth of new modes of governance
through failure and crisis. In the context of recalcitrant
local actors and resilient social structures, peacebuilding
actors can soon become disillusioned with what it is ac-
tually possible to achieve in particular ‘theatres of op-
erations’. From the deeply embedded warlord structure
in Afghanistan to clans in Somalia and the mafia in the
Balkans, international interventions have ‘feet of clay’
(Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 2), and international officials more
often than not are forced to recognize the limit of their
transformative agenda in peacebuilding contexts.
Transcending the categories of ‘successful missions’
(such as ONUSAL in El Salvador) or ‘missions which
failed to complete their mandate’ (such as UNAMIR
in Rwanda)—categories usually linked to mainstream
conceptualization of exit strategies (Caplan, 2012; UN,
2001)—accepted normalcy can either take the shape of a
hasty exit from the country, thus recognizing the impossi-
bility of carrying out a specific mandate, or be associated
with so-called successful missions, with focus shifting
from social transformation to ‘good enough peacebuild-
ing’ (Donais, 2012, p. 151). The UN Secretary-General’s
report ‘No exit without strategy’ exempts the UN from
responsibility for its partial success or failure by consid-
ering that ‘the role of the United Nations is merely to
facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the struc-
tures of violence and create the conditions conducive to
durable peace and sustainable development’ (UN, 2001,
p. 2). However, accepted normalcy can also signify the
ignorance of the international community in resolving a
conflict and can serve as a neo-colonial effort to compart-
mentalize a particular conflict. Richard Caplan (2006, p.
254) argues that exit strategies should be pursued in pro-
portion to the sustainability of peace, while acknowledg-
ing that exit ‘can also be a political matter, the pace of
which may be determined by domestic and international
factors that have little to do with the preparedness of
a territory’.
Accepting alterity has also taken prominence in the
critical literature on peacebuilding, with voices calling
for a rethink on external interventions and the accep-
tance of ‘local’ and ‘indigenous’ forms of peacebuild-
ing. In this context, accepting normalcy involves recog-
nition of the importance of local cultures, knowledge,
traditions, and needs, while accepting local practices
of conflict resolution and organization of political com-
munity, however unpalatable to international officials
these practices may be. For instance, Oliver Richmond
(2008, p. 116) considers external peace frameworks for
governance enshrined in rational and technical problem-
solving logics as ‘normalising governance activities’ that
aim to transfer ‘liberal epistemologies into conflict zones’.
He further argues that ‘local decision making processes
should determine the basic political, economic, and so-
cial processes and norms to be institutionalized in con-
text’ (2011, p. 112), and maintains that peace ‘emerges
from local and indigenous agency, rather than being
prompted externally’ (2013, p. 384). For RogerMacGinty
(2008, p. 139), ‘traditional and indigenous approaches to
peace-making and reconciliation can offer a corrective to
the failings of the Western peace-making model’, hence
making peace the ‘restoration of resonant normality to
everyday life’ (Kappler & Richmond, 2011, p. 274). This
critical alternative to top-down liberal governance leans
more towards accepting local normalcy in its cultural, so-
cial, and everyday manifestations, while considering ex-
ternal support as necessary to enable local peace forma-
tion and emancipation from inequality and discrimina-
tion, and to promote autonomy from external political,
economic, and socio-cultural tutorship. It has to be noted
that this discourse has been criticized as retaining cer-
tain elements of the more mainstream liberal interven-
tionist paradigm, especially in its understanding of the
disputed ‘local’ (Hameiri & Jones, 2017; Randazzo, 2017;
Visoka, 2016b).
The discourse of accepted normalcy is also evident
in the cooperative practices of the international com-
munity with regard to authoritarian regimes, such as
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, or societies with ‘internal trou-
bles’, such as Israel. Despite the fact that these societies
are engaged in widespread torture and human rights
abuses, have breached international law, and have sup-
pressedminorities, these authoritarian, turbulent places
continue to enjoy extensive international acceptance.
This accepted normalcy is often justified in terms of the
war on terror and geopolitical stability, which provide
a blanket reasoning and selectivity for non-intervention.
For instance, the discourse of accepted normalcy was
evident when the UK House of Commons Foreign Af-
fairs Committee did not consider Bahrain’s failed revo-
lution a civil war, despite extensive use of violence by
police against protesters; it concluded that ‘life, on the
whole, continues as normal’ (House of Commons, 2013,
p. 106). The powerful discourse on normalcy propagated
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by Israel and its allies has suppressed the scale of vio-
lence committed in Gaza, the West Bank and other oc-
cupied territories. However, these repressive practices
are justified as acts of self-defence and protection of
democratic society. By calling Israel a democracy, the ex-
emption from intervention is institutionalized and thus
abnormal practices are camouflaged, silently tolerated,
and accepted by the international community. Although
Saudi Arabia is widely criticized for harsh domestic poli-
cies and is considered a significant source of terrorist
funding in theMiddle East and beyond, the US and other
Western democracies continue to consider it a major
foreign-policy ally, and thus treat these domestic and
global sources of insecurity as normal (see: Blanchard,
2015). These examples signify that the discourse of ac-
cepted normalcy inverts discourses of intervention to jus-
tify non-intervention, holding thus the exception to de-
termine what constitutes a normal or abnormal affair in
world politics. However, in the process, accepting the
‘abnormal’ other comes down to transforming the self,
where conceptions of normality are at risk to be radi-
cally transformed. The exception risks becoming the rule
when we ‘take the outside inside’, that is to say when
there is a ‘substantial assimilation of the other into my
horizon’ (Donà, 2006, pp. 57–58). Our own conceptions
of normality end up dramatically transfigured through
this complex interaction between the self and the other.
Finally, the discourse and practices on accepting mul-
tiple normalcies signifies the optimization of interven-
tions in such a way that, when imposing or restoring nor-
malcy is not possible, the ‘abnormal’ state of affairs is ac-
cepted and legitimized internationally. It is a paradigm
of retreat from external, coercive regulation, in a con-
text where policymakers are finding it increasingly diffi-
cult to formulate and impose a coherent political project
for ‘othered’ societies (Finkenbusch, 2017). Thus, accept-
ing normalcy not only blurs international norms, but chal-
lenges themand undermines the credibility of global gov-
ernance. Nevertheless, accepting normalcy can signify
the end of a particular regime or normalization, and si-
multaneously the birth of a new understanding of nor-
malcy, which entails new disciplinary modes and trans-
actions in international politics.
4. Conclusion
This article points to the existence of different discourses
and practices of normalization which seek to ‘make
sense’ of international interventions in turbulent soci-
eties. In contrast with approaches that emphasize the
novelty of specific interventionary forms, this article has
offered an alternative perspective, focusing on how nar-
ratives and practices of normalization include both el-
ements of continuity and change—encompassing both
the continuation of ‘traditional’ interventionary dynam-
ics and the emergence of new post-interventionary dy-
namics. In casting the technology of normalization in ‘tur-
bulent societies’, this article focused on a number of dis-
tinctive sets of discursive practices, ranging from inter-
ventions in ‘abnormal’ societies that seek to reform and
transform through the imposition of external blueprints
of normalcy to interventions that seek to restore soci-
eties to their ante bellum state, as well as new emerg-
ing features of accepting normalcy, where local versions
of ‘peace’ are accepted. Despite the efforts of many so-
cieties to construct alternative normalities, the quest
for governmentality of different ways of life has found
ways of intervening with ever-shifting rationales and jus-
tifications. The resulting ‘order’ emerging from these
governmentality practices can take different shapes and
forms depending on the specific context of interventions:
it can be a liberal in nature through imposing peace
practices—even if this strand of intervention has lost
steam recently—but it can also be quite conservative in
nature through restoring peace practices, or even isola-
tionist or minimalist through accepting peace practices.
In this context, we believe that normal peace has
the potential to become an umbrella notion to under-
stand past, present and future multi-faceted interven-
tions, ranging frompeace-making to peacekeeping, stabi-
lization missions, peacebuilding, and resilience-building.
We see the progressive emergence of the discourse
of normalization as gradually replacing other interven-
tionary paradigms. In specific instances, especially in the
context of the accepted normalcy and restored normalcy
discourses, this change of paradigm indicates a post-
interventionary shift, representing a reduction of expec-
tations vis-à-vis conflict-affected societies as well as a
realization of the limits of liberal interventionism, and
serve as a tactical withdrawal from international respon-
sibilities towards targeted societies. What was first per-
ceived as ‘abnormal’ suddenly becomes normal and ac-
ceptable. Victims of conflict become either resilient sub-
jects or actors of their own destiny, left to their own de-
vices. It is in the context of all-encompassing attempts
to govern risks that discourses of resilience, acceptance
of difference, and permanence of crisis are becoming
enabling frameworks which legitimize optimal normal-
ization expressed in both more radical and fluid forms
of intervention.
Through this cursory review of normalization narra-
tives and practices, we suggest and hint at a shift in
focus from peacebuilding to normalising turbulent soci-
eties, where peace is not seen only as a process either
brought from outside (liberal interventionism or top–
down governance) or constituted from inside (emanci-
patory or everyday forms of peacebuilding), but also
as a mix of social practices—policies and discourses—
produced by and through knowledge production. The
discursive knowledge on fragile states, illiberal social or-
ders of conflict-affected societies, resilience, and perma-
nence of crisis, as well as failure and acceptance of al-
terity, has a direct role in legitimizing particular forms
of normalization. It is the intersection of both ‘worlds’—
the policy and academic spheres—that enables the con-
stitution of the meanings of normalcy and normalization
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practices identified in this article. This necessitates ques-
tioning the impact of knowledge production in normaliz-
ing and abnormalizing discourses and practices of peace.
From liberal peacebuilding discourses and debates to the
resilience literature and emancipatory peacebuilding lit-
erature, this article has drawn together different sets of
discursive policies that shape the field of international
normalization practices. It is therefore crucial to recog-
nize that knowledge production about turbulent soci-
eties has a direct impact in shaping discursive and prac-
tical aspects of intervention. What we see emerging is
a need to further theorize normalcy and normalization
practices across different disciplines to make sense of
its praxeological and discursive invocation in contempo-
rary global affairs. Therefore, what this study points out
is that dominant normative frameworks—such as gov-
ernance, stability, peace, justice, development—guiding
international interventions are inherently unstable as
they constantly undergo multi-sited transitions, some of
which are demonstrated in this paper through an analysis
of narratives and practices that seek to impose, restore,
or accept multiple versions of normalcy in world politics.
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